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WHAT IS LEGAL THEORY AND WHAT IS IT
DOING IN THE CURRICULUM? A VIEW
FROM CONTRACTS
by Robert Birmingham*
I am not sure that I know what you mean when you ask me if
I don't believe that the law is a monad.
-Holmes to Wut
'Everyone maximizes utility.'
This claim needs interpretation, be-
cause it looks filled with content,
but really is innocuous, a tautology,
nothing to get upset about. It
means merely that one's behavior
invariably maximizes some func-
tion. As Samuelson's imperative,
"[C]herchez la maximization, ' 2
suggests, often it is an interesting
task and something of an art to re-
cover the function from the behav-
ior. I offer three examples of maxi-
mizing, eliminating purpose by
degrees.
(1) Landes and Posner recently
A places an amount of money in
an envelope and seals the envelope.
Then she tosses a fair coin. If the
coin lands heads, she puts twice that
amount of money in a second envel-
ope and seals it. If the coin lands
tails, she puts half that amount of
money in the second envelope and
seals it. She hands an envelope each
to B and C. Before B opens her en-
velope, should B prefer to exchange
envelopes with C? What if she opens
her envelope and finds $10?
FIGURE 1
Test Question
endorsed "the hypothesis that the
common law of torts is best explained as if the judges who created the
law through decisions operating as precedents in later cases were trying
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut; A.B., J.D., Ph.D., University of Pittsburgh;
LL.M., Harvard University.
I. Letter from OW. Holmes to John C.H. Wu, Feb. 5, 1923, reprinted in JUSTICE HOLMES TO
DOCTOR Wu: AN INTIMATE CORRESPONDENCE,' 1921-1932, at 7, 7 (n.d.). The correspondence at
least on Holmes' side which alone is reported is not very intimate and consists of Holmes politely
saying he does not know what Wu is talking about. Cf. CASES AND MATERIALS ON JURISPRU-
DENCE (J. Wu ed. 1958).
2. Weintraub, Book Review, 28 J. ECON. LIT. 1192, 1192 (1990), quoting JOHN VON NEU-
MANN AND MODERN ECONOMICS 112 (M. Dore, S. Chakravarty & R. Goodwin eds. 1989).
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to promote efficient resource allocation." ' I.e. what delighted the old
judges was approaching Pareto optima, although they could not recog-
nize, as Landes and Posner see retrospectively, the source of their util-
ity. (2) Polar bears are white. What are they maximizing? Bishop
Montefiore says 'Nothing': "As for camouflage, this is not always easily
explicable on neo-Darwinian premises. If polar bears are dominant in
the Arctic, then there would seem to have been no need for them to
evolve a white-colored form of camouflage." 4 Dawkins paraphrases,
I personally, off the top of my head sitting in my study, never
having visited the Arctic, never having seen a polar bear in the
wild, and having been educated in classical literature and the-
ology, have not so far managed to think of a reason why polar
bears might benefit from being white,'
then says polar bears maximize sneaking up on seals. (3) A rope sus-
pended between two points "will hang in the shape of a catenary, y(x)
- alelx + a2elx, because even a dumb rope knows that such a shape
will minimize its center of gravity," and attaining a low center of grav-
ity is just what a rope wants.6
I
If the extension of 'everyone' includes ropes, it includes law teach-
ers: they too must implicitly maximize some function, the challenge be-
ing to recover it. To do so, I presuppose they want to teach law effec-
tively, and ask, 'What understanding of legal theory makes their
behavior maximizing?' The place of legal theory in the curriculum, the
topic of this panel, falls out of the pragmatics. The questions of Figure
1 invites the conferee in the course of solving them to identify the theo-
ries underlying her behavior.7
Of course law teachers do not act alike. I read 'law teachers' re-
strictively, indeed parochially, making its extension not just educators
in American law schools-the only ones I can introspect about-but
mainly C. C. Langdell. The restriction has its disadvantages, since,
3. W. LANDES & R. POSNER. THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW I (1987).
4. R. DAWKINS. THE BLIND WATCHMAKER 38 (1986), quoting H. MONTEFIORE. THE
PROBABILITY OF GOD (1985).
5. Id.
6. Samuelson, A Catenary Turnpike Theorem Involving Consumption and the Golden Rule,
in 3 P. SAMUELSON. THE COLLECTED SCIENTIFIC PAPERS OF PAUL A. SAMUELSON 93, 93 (1972).
7. Nalebuff, Puzzles: The Other Person's Envelope Is Always Greener, 2 J. ECON. PERSPEC-
TIVES 149, 150 (1988), 3 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 171 (1989).
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starting with Holmes, who called him "perhaps the greatest living legal
theologian," 8 almost everyone, e.g. Gilmore, although not Grey,9 has
laughed at Langdell, Gilmore saying, "[I]f Langdell had-not existed,
we would have had to invent him. Langdell seems to have been an es-
sentially stupid man who, early in his life, hit on one great idea to
which, thereafter, he clung with all the tenacity of genius."1
Okay, but even Gilmore believed Langdell matters, continuing:
"However absurd, however mischievous, however deeply rooted in error
it may have been, Langdell's idea shaped our legal thinking for fifty
years.""
Still, Gilmore is careless about what idea Langdell clung to: that
law is a science, surely; yet Gilmore has no understanding of what a
science is. A discipline whose propositions are conceivably refutable
(Popper)? No matter: our concern is the pedagogy accompanying
Langdell's idea, described thus:
Langdell's chief innovation in legal education was the intro-
duction of the so-called case method of teaching in which the
principal (in Langdell's original version, the only) materials
presented to the student are the reports of decided cases,
whose meaning is to be worked out by study and in classroom
discussion. The case method, which was bitterly attacked for a
generation after Langdell had introduced it, had by the time
of World War I, been adopted in almost all American law
schools. Langdell's Cases on Contracts was the first casebook
of all.12
To get anywhere, we must inspect the case method in action. Nev-
ertheless as far as I know there is no transcription of Langdell's class.
We are told, "Teaching his first class in Contracts" in 1870, Langdell,
newly Dean of the Harvard Law School, "began not with the custom-
ary introductory lecture, but by asking 'Mr. Fox, will you state the
facts in the case of Payne v. Cave?' ",3 We are not however told what
Fox replied etc. Nor does a law teacher today commence with Payne v.
8. Book Notice, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880) (reviewing C. LANGDELL. A SELECTION OF
CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. WITH A SUMMARY OF THE Topics COVERED BY THE CASES
(2d ed. 1879)).
9. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983).
10. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977).
II. Id.
12. Id. at 125 n.3.
13. Grey, supra note 9, at I.
19911
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
Cave"'4 , a case no longer read, so that even Gilmore's casebook,' 5 the
most preserving of the traditional cases, omits it. No unbearable loss: in
Payne, Cave at auction bid for a pewter worm but withdrew his bid
before the hammer fell; the court held he might do so. The case is fun
to teach only because of the stated great weight of the worm, "1300
hundredweight," and because few students know what a worm is: cer-
tainly not the "small harmless serpent that lives in the earth" or the
"grub[] that gnaw[s] wood and furniture" as Dr. Johnson defines it.' 6
It is a spiral condensing tube for distilling;' 7 still, the weight is
unexplained.
Hence I turn to fiction, in the first instance Osborne's The Paper
Chase.'8 The novel begins with Kingsfield doing push-ups in his office,
but presently he goes to Contracts class, at which point we pick up the
action.
Most of the first year students, in anticipation of their
first class at the Harvard Law School, were already seated as
Professor Kingsfield, at exactly five minutes past nine, walked
purposely through the little door behind the lecture platform.
He put his books and notes down on the wooden lectern and
pulled out the seating chart. One hundred and fifty names and
numbers ....
At exactly ten past nine, Professor Kingsfield picked a
name from the seating chart. The name came from the left
side of the classroom. Professor Kingsfield looked off to the
right, his eyes following one of the curving benches to where it
ended by the window.
Without turning, he said crisply, "Mr. Hart, will you re-
cite the facts of Hawkins versus McGee?"
When Hart, seat 259, heard his name, he froze. Caught
unprepared, he simply stopped functioning. Then he felt his
heart beat faster than he could ever remember its beating and
his palms and arms break out in sweat.
Professor Kingsfield rotated slowly until he was staring
14. 3 Term. R. 148, 100 Eng. Rep. 502 (K.B. 1789).
15. F. KESSLER, G. GILMORE & A. KRONMAN. CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed.
1986).
16. S. JOHNSON. A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE N.P. (London 1755).
17. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2953 (2d ed. 1960).
18. J. OSBORN. THE PAPER CHASE 73 (1971).
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down at Hart. The rest of the class followed Kingsfield's eyes.
"I have got your name right?" Kingsfield asked. "You
are Mr. Hart?" He spoke evenly, filling every inch of the hall.
[Hart's] voice floated across the classroom: "I . . . haven't
read the case. I only found out about it just now."
Kingsfield walked to the, edge of the platform.
"Mr. Hart, I will myself give you the facts of the case.
Hawkins versus McGee is a case in contract law, the subject
of our study. A boy burned his hand by touching an electric
wire. A doctor who wanted to experiment in skin grafting
asked to operate on the hand, guaranteeing that he would re-
store the hand 'one hundred percent.' Unfortunately, the oper-
ation failed to produce a healthy hand. Instead it produced a
hairy hand. A hand not only burned, but covered with dense
matted hair.
"Now, Mr. Hart, what sort of damages do you think the
doctor should pay?"
"The difference between what he was promised and what
he got, a worse hand?" Hart asked.
Kingsfield stared off to the right, picked a name from the
seating chart.
"Mr. Pruit, perhaps you can tell the class if we should
give the boy the difference between what he was promised and
what he got, as Mr. Hart suggests, or the difference between
what he got, and what he had."'19
Kingsfield, like Fuller20 before him, starts with Hawkins v. Mc-
Gee.2 Hamilton, Rau and Weintraub still do.22 The exchange is hard
on Hart. Regard, however, how Kingsfield handles Hart's answer. The
problem for Kingsfield is that improbably Hart has already hit on the
expectation measure of damages: Hart has given Kingsfield the correct
answer. The exigencies of plot may require this. Hence Kingsfield
moves on to Pruit, hoping he will answer incorrectly, getting the class
barking down the trail of reliance damages. It is a good thing pedagog-
19. Id. at 6-9.
20. L. FULLER. BASIC CONTRACT LAW 1 (1946).
21. 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929). The 'before' is logical not chronological, Kingsfield hav-
ing started teaching before Fuller's casebook.
22. R. HAMILTON, A. RAU & R. WEINTRAUB, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATEiRIALS I (1984).
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ically that Pruit be wrong.
I take my second exhibit from Turow's One L.23 We are still at
Harvard, but the Contracts class is further along. Perini not Kingsfield
is teaching.
We were studying Hadley v. Baxendale, a famous case
which established a limit on the kinds of damages a winning
plaintiff in a contract suit could collect. Perini asked us what
the rule of Hadley [sic] was not designed to do. He said there
was a one-word answer. People raised their hands offering re-
sponses ranging from "work" to "make sense," and Perini
toured the room, quickly shooting them down: "No," "Never,"
"Silly," "You think that makes sense?"
When he saw my hand, he whirled and pointed.
"To punish," I said. I was shocked I was speaking. My
heart was slamming in my chest.
Perini came closer, tilting his head. "How so?"
"The way the rule works, it doesn't act to punish some-
body who breaches a contract."
"What difference does that make?"
"It means that damages aren't awarded to deter breach."
"What are they intended to do, then?" Perini asked.
"Just compensate the loss."
"Right!" said Perini.
MAGEE But [logical positiv- "Contract damages are merely
ism' must have had real defects, intended to compensate plain-
What do you now, in retrospect, tiff for his loss. You leave all
think the main ones were? that soul-splitting over punish-
AYER [the leading Anglo-
American logical positivist] Well, I ment behind in Torts and
suppose the most important of the Criminal Law-it's not for
defects was that nearly all of it was Contracts!" '24
false. Perini screws up, reminding
FIGURE 2 the reader of Wittgenstein's re-
All About Logical Positivism mark: "It is his enormous mistake
which is great. I.e. roughly speaking if you just add a '-' to the whole
book it says an important truth."25 Perini is almost that badly off, be-
23. S. TUROW. ONE L (1977).
24. Id. at 73.




cause a better answer than 'Punish' is 'Compensate'. Hence he is teach-
ing them all wrong substantively. The method is what matters here,
however: the dialogue occurs respecting a case, Hadley, that every
common lawyer knows, about a broken mill shaft returned to the man-
ufacturer as a model for a replacement. The carrier in breach of con-
tract sent the shaft by boat instead of train, delaying its arrival. The
mill had been stopped for want of a shaft and Hadley sought lost prof-
its. He lost because (despite the headnote) he had not told the carrier
or at least Baxendale himself that the mill was stopped. No expectation
damages here, not because they are not efficient, but because a party to
a contract contemplating breach can only tell whether to breach if she
knows the other party's prospective loss, and it is worth motivating this
other party to tell her this loss at the cost of otherwise underdeterring
breach. But, thinking pedagogically, notice how Perini likes getting
wrong answers-although he fails to exploit the students' mistakes,
merely replying 'Silly' and so forth.
That is the data. I am not all that concerned about the 'legal' part
of 'legal theory'; 'theory' is the problem I address. The logical posi-
tivists blessed us with a definition of 'theory' everyone once accepted:
"a set of sentences or propositions, expressible in the first-order predi-
cate calculus. 27 That made a theory a linguistic entity. Ignore the
'first-order' part; it just requires that variables range over individuals,
not sets. In a first order language, one can talk about a contract, the
thing, but not the property of being a contract (contracthood). But law-
yers do not need to do that. So cast about in the law for something that
is a theory in this logical positivist sense. A good candidate is Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, 8 the writing. Law students quickly catch
on that the case method teaches legal rules only inefficiently, and buy
Gilbert's. Neither Kingsfield nor Perini direct, e.g., 'Learn sections 1-
90'. Logical positivism however is defunct as Figure 2 indicates. The
favored definition of 'theory' today likely is that a theory is not the
sentences themselves but the underlying semantics. 2 9 Then the law
would be not the Restatement but a domain, a function from 'contract'
etc. to sets of sets of elements in the domain ..... The structure inter-
26. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
27. Churchland, On the Nature of Theories: A Neurocomputational Perspective, in ScIEN-
TIFiC THEORIES 59, 59 (W. Savage ed. 1990).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981).
29. See, e.g., R. GEIRE. EXPLAINING SCIENCE: A COGNITIVE APPROACH (1988); F SUPPE.
TIlE SEMANTIC CONCEPTION OF THEORIES AND SCIENTIFIC REALISM (1989); B. VAN FRAASSEN.
LAWS AND SYMMETRY (1989). Cf B. MAGEE. MEN OF IDEAS 131 (1978).
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prets the Restatement. But Kingsfield and Perini are not directly teach-
ing that either. Three other definitions of 'theory', more strictly legal, I
dismiss by note."0
II
I look for a discipline with these characteristics. A. Its subject
matter is intractable like law. B. The hardware (wetware) for process-
ing it is similar. C. The teaching technique is the same. Interpreting
sonar signals suffices.
A. Intractability
Clancy's novel The Hunt for Red October3 describes these two
protagonists aboard the USS Dallas, a 688-class attack submarine: 32
Sonarman Second Class Ronald Jones
Three years earlier, Jones had been asked
to leave the California institute of Technology
in the middle of his junior year. He had pulled
one of the ingenious pranks for which Cal Tech
students were justly famous, only it hadn't
worked. Now he was serving his time in the
navy to finance his return. It was his an-
nounced intention to get a doctorate in cyber-
netics and signal processing. . . . Jones' IQ
was 158, the highest on the boat by a fair mar-
gin. He had a placid face and sad brown eyes
that women found irresistible. On the beach
Jones had enough action to wear down a squad
of marines.
BC-10
During her last overhaul, the Dallas had
received a very special toy to go along with her
BQQ-5 sonar system. . . . It was the most
powerful computer yet installed aboard a sub-
marine. Though only about the size of a busi-
ness desk, it cost over five million dollars and
ran at eighty million operations per second.
[ . . Tihe BC-10 stripped away ambient noise
and other naturally produced sea sounds to
classify and identify man-made noise. It could
identify ships by name from their individual
acoustical signatures, much as one could iden-
tify the finger or voice prints of a human.
An index of intractability is the reputed intelligence of the participants.
In The Hunt for Red October peculiarity accompanies genius. So the
30. (I) The mean content of courses called 'Jurisprudence' or 'Legal Philosophy'. The distri-
bution here is likely bimodal. There are historical surveys, sort of stamp collecting, as in Christie's
casebook. If jurisprudence is not largely taxonomic, usually it is Oxford ordinary language philos-
ophy, as by H.L.A. Hart. Law schools train lawyers, who need not know these things. Legal
philosophy done as ordinary language philosophy is speaking in a dead tongue. Cf. W. MIL ER. A
CANTICLE FOR LEIBOWITZ (1959).
(2) Law and .... Entries here include Feminist Legal Theory, Law and Economics, Critical
Legal Studies (read maybe insensitively as Law and Marxism), Law and Literature, Critical Race
Studies. These are more nearly nonlegal theory applied to law. They--especially Law and Eco-
nomics-may, however, be a way of doing law, as being a tree was once a way of being a person.
(3) Legal metatheory. Calling the law a 'monad' is not straight theory but metatheoreti-
cal-talk about legal theory. Cases get decided identically whether or not law is a monad. This
Essay is metatheoretical. The required demarcation, however, is between nontheory and theory,
not between theory and metatheory.
31. T. CLANCY. THE HUNT FOR RED OCTOBER (1984).
32. Id. at 70-71, 74.
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reader encounters Jones "in his usual trance."3 And sonarpersons com-
mune with whales (whose songs can travel through the water around
the globe). BC-10 is smart too, although like a billion dollars, eighty
MIPs is not what it used to be, and Jones one time calls BC-10 "a real
kludge" for misidentifying a signal as a magma displacement (Clancy
explains: "Jones' epithet was the most pejorative curse of electronics
people"34). Nor does 1Clancy say how BC-10 does on a beach. Off hand,
however, Jones and C-10 seem smarter than Hart; and the narrator of
One L did not make law review.
B. Hardware 8
The computer I describe,
call it 'BC-11', is a massively
parallel network. It is an artifi-
cial brain. Its function on a sub-
inputs E output marine is for my purposes to dis-
tinguish a rock from a mine,
useful because mines but not
rocks explode. I first specify the
activities of its individual
FIGURE 3 processing units (neurons), then
Processing Unit indicate how they are connected
into a network.
1. Processing Unit. Figure 3 portrays a processing unit or neuron
of BC-1 1. Call a representative output of the jth processing unit 'pj',
and the weight of pj as an input of the ith processing unit 'wij'. The
bias of the ith unit, a constant added to the weighted sum of its inputs,
is 0i. Translate '2' as 'sum of'. The ith processing unit, then, initially
calculates E i by Equation (1):
Ei = Wigpj + 0i  (1)J
For example, for two inputs, .2 and .7, with weights -. 5 and 1, and a
bias of .4, E = .2(..5) + .7(1) + .4 = .1.
33. Id. at 70.
34. Id. at 76-77.
35. The mathematics is from Gorman and Sejnowski, Learned Classification of Sonar Targets
Using a Massively Parallel Network, 36 IEEE TRANSACTIONS: ACOUSTICS, SPEECH. AND SIGNAt_
PROCESSING 1135 (1988). I do not read IEEE Transactions: Acoustics. Speech. and Signal
Processing regularly. I got onto Gorman and Sejnowski through Churchland, supra note 27.
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Then, to get its output, pi, the ith processing unit transforms Ei by
Equation (2):
pi P(Ei) + e -E i  (2)
Here e is the base of the
1 natural logarithms - 2.7. If E i
= 0, then e*-Ei = I and conse-
quently pi = 1/(1 + 1) = .5.As Ei increases positively, pi gets
0 larger, at first rapidly, then
-5 0 slowly, approaching 1; as Ei in-
total input creases negatively, pi correspond-
FIGURE 4 ingly becomes smaller, approach-
Sigmoidal Transformation ing 0. Always then pi lies
between 0 and 1. The function P
is a sigmoidal transformation; Figure 4 graphs it.
2. Network. BC-II is a
<1.0> - rine
three-layer network of the indi- <o. ,i>-rk
vidual processing units, con- output
nected as in Figure 5.36 The in-
put units receive data from hidden
outside the network, here regis- Aui
tering the energy at various fre-
quencies of sonar signals from 000000C00
rocks and mines, normalized to <.14 .42 .61 .74 .87 .52 .63 .84 .53 .41 .78 .39 .10>
real numbers between 0 and 1. L
Each input unit is connected to frequncy
each hidden unit, although I FIGURE 5
have not drawn all the connec- BC-1I
tions. The two output units together transmit outside the computer an
ordered pair of numbers between 0 and 1. If the object listened to is a
mine, ideally they signal <1, 0>; if a rock, <0, 1>. With 105
(_102) connections in Figure 5, BC-Il is simpler than Jones, whose
brain contains 1014 connections.
C. Teaching BC-11
One can teach the computer many skills besides differentiating be-
36. Churchland, supra note 27, at 75 fig. 5.
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tween rocks and mines: e.g. to recognize phonemes (U), hard because
the sound patterns differ greatly among speakers; and to read out loud
from a printed text. I stick with rocks and mines. Here the "difficulty is
twofold: echoes from both objects sound indistinguishable to the casual
ear, and echoes from each type show wide variation in sonic
character.""7
The teacher, call her 'Kingsfield' ('Kingsfield 2'), collects sample
sonar signals from rocks and mines. They become the teaching set, a
casebook's analogue. So Kingsfield gives BC-II a signal (states a case).
At the beginning, BC-11, like Hart, just guesses. In technical terms,
their wijs have arbitrary small values. If BC- 11 answers correctly,
Kingsfield proceeds to the next signal. (In the legal event, Kingsfield
sent the same signal to a different network: Pruit.) But outside fiction
the computer will err as did Perini's students. Imagine Kingsfield offers
a rock noise and BC-11 replies: '<.7, .2>'. Then Kingsfield sends an
error message, the equivalent of Perini's "No," "Never," "Silly," or
"You think that makes sense?"
Okay. So BC-I 1 knows it has made a mistake. It has an al-
gorithm, a sort or recipe, that tells it what to do next. The word is from
the arabic al-Khuw-rizmi, surname of abu-Ja'far Mohammed ibn-
MUsa, the ninth-century author of a book on arithmetic, translated into
Latin with the name algorism us.3 8
First, it locates the error, or rather distributes it among the out-
puts of its processing units. It does this in two steps. It calculates the
error terms for its two output units, bi(v), by Equation (3),
= (pi* - pi) P'(E(N)), (3)
where
N = number of layers (three)
pi* - desired output of ith unit
pi = actual output of ith unit
Pi* - Pi = how far off is output of ith unit
P'(Ei(N)) = slope of the function of Figure 4
Given that the signal is a rock's, pl* - = 0- .7 = -. 7 and P2* - p2
-1-.2 = .8.
Then it backpropagates the error to the units of the other layers,
that is, it figures out these units' complicity in the final errors, by
37. Churchland, supra 27, at 70.
38. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 64.
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Equation (4),
b(n) = 2;( + /) W(q)pIE(q~ 4Ii J J i 9 (4)J
Equation (4) directs: to obtain the error of the ith hidden unit, for n =
2, or of the ith input unit, for n = 1, weight the errors of the units it
transmits to, those in the next layer up, by the importance of its signal
to those units; add up the weighted errors; and, again, multiply by the
slope of the function P.
Now BC-II has calculated the errors by its various processors.
Second, its the algorithm tells it to change the wi1s according to Equa-
tion (5),
AWO) + . b'n+ 1) p() (5)
the 'A' indicating the change, the '' setting BC-1 l's rate of learning. If
f is too big, if the learning is insufficiently gradual, BC-II might oscil-
late among misunderstandings. The process completed, Kingsfield goes
on to another sonar signal (in Fuller's casebook, Clark v. Marsiglia 9
whose plaintiff failed to mitigate damages, since he kept on cleaning
paintings after their owner, breaking the contract, told him to cease).
BC- 11 will make more mistakes, receive error messages, and correct
the wijs. So will Pruit. That is all there is to it. Notice however that a
case contains its own error message, because an opinion not only states
the facts but tells their legal consequences.
III
BC- 11, and Hart, should eventu- Suppose you're on a game show
ally achieve wi1s that elicit few error and given a choice of three doors.
messages. The way to tell is to test Behind one is a car; behind the
them. Hence the nautical Kingsfield others are goats. You pick Door No.
will give the machine a test set of so- 1, and the host, who knows what's
behind them, opens No. 3, which has
nar signals from rocks and mines, sig- a goat. He then asks if you want to
nals it has not heard before, but switch to No. 2. Should you switch?
should have learned to interpret. For
instance, the test question of Figure 1 FIGURE 6
might be answerable from experience Teaching Question
with the teaching of Figure 6,40 and itself belong to a later teaching set.
39. I Denio 317 (N.Y. 1845).
40. Letter from Robert Sachs, Ph.D., to Marilyn vos Savant, n.d., in vos Savant, Ask
Marilyn, PARADE MAG., Dec. 2, 1990, at 25. See Tierney, Behind Mority Hall's Doors: Puzzle.
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The test set for Hart, the Contracts examination, went thus, as far as
we know, The Paper Chase being reticent about it, as if the topic were
copulation, and the book respectably Victorian.
Hart stood outside Ames Hall. The exam would begin in
ten minutes. He kept away from the small groups of students
nervously talking on the lawn. He kept a tree between himself
and the others.
He was talking to himself, not openly, but in his mind,
addressing himself in commands.
"Listen, Hart," he said, "shake contracts. Pour it out on
that exam. Shake it loose and pour it all out. Don't leave the
smallest fact in your mind. Make a clean sweep. Write it all
down and sweep it out."
At five of nine, he walked into the building, up the steps,
taking them one at a time in measured strides, looking
straight ahead. Into the building, down the hall, on the last
walk.
The exam books were laid out on the desks, an empty
seat between each book so there would be no cheating. Hart
took a seat at the side of the room so that there would be as
few people around him as possible. % Correct Classification
Others were filing in too. Number of Average Per- Average Per-
Some were studying their out- Hidden formance on formance on
lines in a futile attempt to Units Training Sets Test Sets
cram in the things they should 0 79.3 73.1
have learned before. Others 2 96.2 85.7
were just moving blindly to- 3 98.1 87.66 99.4' 89.3
ward the nearest seat in a 12 99.8 90.4
short mindless dance, their 24 100.0 89.2
arms hanging limp at their
sides. FIGURE 7
"O.K., baby, O.K.," Hart Effect of Hidden Units (1)
said, rubbing his palms together. The people near him yanked
around.
"O.K.," he repeated, "bring that fucking test in here." '41
The next sentence is: "Hart walked out into the yard after his contracts
Debate, and Answer?, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1991, §1, at 1, col. 5.
41. J. OSBORN, supra note 18, at 178-79.
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exam."
42
BC-11 does learn, as Gorman and Sejnowski show for a network
with sixty input units. The excitement for theory is in its hidden units.
Figure 7 shows BC-1 l's response to training sets, then to test sets of
unfamiliar signals of rocks and mines, as a function of the number of
these units."a Figure 8 displays BC-1 i's learning curves, also as func-
tions of these units."
Studying the data tells one: (1) hidden units matter, BC-i I's suc-
cess rate on test sets varying between 73.1 % and 90.4% as a function
of the number of these units; (2) a computer learns faster if it has
fewer hidden units, as one sees from Figure 8, where e.g. the left part
of the curve for no hidden units is above the other curves; (3) if a
computer has too many hidden units, it perhaps does perfectly on the
training set, but its performance on the test sets falls off. Basically if it
has too few hidden units it is too
many, it memorizes the training
signals.
stupid to learn much; if it has too
set, hence cannot deal with new
FIGURE 8
Effect of Hidden Units (2)
examination in Contracts,
We have all encountered
students using too few or too
many units. (2) above, that stu-
dents with suboptimally many
units learn more quickly, is espe-
cially true in Contracts. It is a
year course. Usually I must ex-
amine the students in December,
because other students switch
into my class for the second se-
mester, and they are examined
by the teachers they are leaving.
I speculate that on a December
I get a better reading by inverting the
grades. Understanding strikes the Contracts student using the right
number of neurons like light hitting Saul on the road to Damascus:
suddenly, in April, she sees. BC- 11 learns more gradually.
Keeping in mind from Part I that the usual definitions of 'theory'
did not fit Kingsfield's and Perini's practice, think of BC- 11 having a
42. Id. at 179.
43. Gorman and Sejnowski, supra note 35, at 1138 table I.
44. Id. at 1139 fig. 4. The data differ somewhat between the figures because the training sets
of Figure 7 are selected to include all target angles, while those of Figure 8 are randomly selected.
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theory that is the wijs.
[N]etworks have contrived a system of internal represen-
tations that truly corresponds to important distinctions and
structures in the outside world, structures that are not explic-
itly represented in the corpus of their sensory inputs. The
value of those representations is that they and only they allow
the networks to 'make sense' of their variegated and often
noisy input corpus, in the sense that they and only they allow
the network to respond to Partition separating metallic
those inputs in a fashion fr .. onmealic jectsRegi .on of prototypical R~o o ~to..
that systematically RintrtyioIRegion of prototypical
minelik vecorsrock like vectors
reduces the error
messages to a trickle.
These, I need hardly re-
mind, are the functions
typically ascribed to
theories.
* . * An individual's
overall theory-of-the-
world, we might venture, FIGURE 9
is not a large collection or BC- I's Theory
a long list of stored sym-
bolic items. Rather, it is a specific point in that individual's
synaptic weight space. It is a configuration of connection
weights, a configuration that partitions the system's activa-
tion-vector space(s) into useful divisions and subdivisions rela-
tive to the inputs typically fed the system. 'Useful' here means
'tends to minimize the error messages'."'
The outputs of the hidden units are a vector in a space having as
many dimensions as there are hidden units. Figure 9 shows this space
for three dimensions. The wijs partition that space into a part for which
BC-1 I responds 'rock' and a part for which it responds 'mine'. Within
these parts are regions of paradigmatic rock and mine vectors respec-
tively, represented by the hatched areas of Figure 9. BC-I I's implicit
theory is: only mines are metallic.4
With 'theory' so defined, there is invariably a theory. The role of
legal theory in the curriculum is pervasive. "[N]o cognitive activity
45. Churchland, supra note 27, at 82.
46. Id. at 80.
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whatever takes place in the absence of vectors being processed by some
specific configuration of weights"; hence "no cognitive activity takes
place in the absence of some theory or other."'47 And if the cognitive
activity is legal, so is the theory legal theory.
IV
The logical positivists, besides thinking of theories as sentential,
also distinguished between observational terms and theoretical terms.
In the end, 'liability' belongs to the observation language; but 'contract'
is incorrigibly theoretical.
The legal version of the conun-
drum goes back at least to Hens normally roost in their owner'sdrum goes bhut, and the latter sweeps out theirHolmes 8 who insisted the bad per- droppings in the morning. Some-
son wanted from her attorney only times a hen will decide to nest and
advice about liability: what the law lay in another hut. Then it is the
would do to her as a function of her custom to leave her to hatch her
behavior. Also it has been common brood there, the bird's owner giving
one of the hatched chickens to thephilosophically to deny. contracts owner of the hut which sheltered
exist, because they are not concrete them. This gift is sanctioned by the
like cows: a contract lacks causal belief that a man who sweeps up the
powers, in contrast to a cow, which droppings of another man's bird is
can burn down Chicago. I have en- exposed to the risk of developing a
water-filled cyst unless one of the
countered but a single case of legal chickens can be called his own.
entities being physical causes: as Sweeping the droppings of one's own
Figure 10 reports, nonownership of hen is not supposed to have any ill
fowl is a pathogen of water-filled effects.
cysts.49  FIGURE 10
Theoretical terms in the first Forensic Medicine
instance describe the partition that
the wijs make in the space of the hidden units. Imagine the training set
is Llewellyn's casebook on Sales,50 a venerated text by a legal realist.
The traditional casebook is Langdell's: 51 "By present-day standards, it
was a curious work. It contained only 336 cases, only slightly edited,
47. Id. at 92.
48. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459-60 (1897).
49. M. DOUGLAS. Social and Religious Symbolism of the Lele, in IMPLICIT MEANINGS: Es-
SAYS IN ANTHROPOLOGY 9, II (1975).
50. K. LLEWELLYN. CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES (1930).




Llewellyn's use of cases departed from tradition in several re-
spects. The majority of 'cases' consisted of a summary of the
facts together with the result, the reasoning being omitted en-
tirely. Behind this were two ideas, inherited from Corbin and
Cook; first the idea that at least as much significance should
be attached to what judges do (the result based on the facts as
the judges saw them) as to what they say by way of justifica-
tion. Secondly, the idea that the facts of cases have a signifi-
cance that transcends their significance as precedents and il-
lustrations of doctrine: they are [Case No. 259] G. AMSINCK
concrete illustrations of busi- & CO. V. SPRINGFIELD GRO-
ness situations, which give a CER CO., 300 Fed. 452 (S.D. Mo.,
flavor of practice beyond the 1924) the contract called for "Java
particular legal issues involved; white granulated sugar." There was
evidence that sugar produced in Javathey are also excellent raw ma- is neither white nor granulated. S
terial for students to treat as tendered Java sugar which B re-
problems, more closely related jected, and S sued for the price.
to 'real life' . . . .5 Held for B. The court seemed much
influenced by the fact that the exact
I display a representative case ed- nature of "Java sugar" was unkown
ited by Llewellyn as Figure 11.1" to all but a few experts and that B, a
So Hart studies a set of these jobber of groceries, including sugar,
teaching cases, and bifurcates the probably relied on the word "granu-lated" in the contract.
space of the hidden units, liability FIGURE 11
(= mine) in one subspace, no lia- A Case Stated Without Essential
bility (= rock) in the other. BC-1 1 Theoretical Terms
52. Farnsworth, Casebooks: Contracts Scholarship in the Age of the Anthology, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1406, 1409 (1987).
53. W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 132 (1973) (footnote
omitted).
54. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 50, at 312-13 (1930).
A note on calling black 'white'. Mitchell v. Henry, 15 Ch. D. 181 (C.A. 1880), also declined
to do it. Still, Swift said of attorneys, "I said there was a Society of Men among us, bred up from
their Youth in the Art of proving by Words, multiplied for the Purpose, that White is Black and
Black is White." J. SWIFT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS 295-96 (Crown ed. 1947). Now news from a
sister discipline. Cf. T. GREEN. Lectures on Logic, in 2 THE WORKS OF THOMAS HILL GREEN:
PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS 157, 161 (R. Nettleship ed. 1886). Theology teaches: "That we may be
altogether of the same mind and in conformity with the Church herself, if she shall have defined
anything to be black which to our eyes appears white, we ought in like manner to pronounce it
black." R. POPKIN. THE HISTORY OF SKEPTICISM FROM ERASMUS TO SPINOZA 4 (1979) (quoting
Saint Ignatus Loyola). Finally, to unite the disciplines, recall that in Rabelais, attorneys "tourne
le noir en blanc," incited by Satan. F. RABELAIS. LE TIERS LIVRE 299 (M. Screech ed. 1964).
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implicitly distinguishes metal things; Hart, contracts.
Why make the theories explicit? First, see that any output of BC-
11 or Hart is verbal. They say 'Mine' or 'Liability', then get error
messages. With explicit theories, the student's output can be about the
theories, and itself subject to error messages. For instance, '<1, 0>'
and '<0, 1>' might be read 'Metal' and 'Nonmetal' or 'Contract' and
'No contract, and Kingsfield respond, e.g., 'No, there is a contract in
Amsinck, it is just that S is not liable for the price'. The anticipated
gain is that BC- I and Hart would learn about liability, which Holmes
says is what counts, quicker or more accurately. Such tuition would
complement, not replace, that about mines and liability. The input at
the second stage would be the right response in the first stage, '<1,
0>' or '<0, 1>', depending on whether a contract exists, plus some
description of the factors bearing on liability, given a contract or not.
The first, theoretical stage would elicit a space of hidden units like
that of Figure 9, but with subspaces deciding whether there is a con-
tract instead of whether there is liability. Hart partitions that space
too, implicitly using a new theory. This new theory is for instance that
contracts (old theoretical term) are promises (observational term) with
consideration (new theoretical term).
And'the process is repeated, with Kingsfield next assigning Hamer
v. Sidway,55 in which a nephew who abstained from many evil things
until twenty-one gave consideration, and Kirksey v. Kirksey,5" in which
a sister-in-law who moved seventy miles to a new home did not.
Holmes' 'bargain' must be the term for the new partition that plays the
role 'contract' and 'consideration' do for the old: the uncle was bargain-
ing, the brother-in-law was not. Here however contract law exhausts its
theoretical language, cannot further describe its own theory, although
the theory is still there. Description fails because 'bargain' is only an
heuristic appeal to ordinary language, or because 'consideration' and
'bargain' are more nearly interdefinable than the second belonging to a
theory about, being an analysis of, the first.
Three brief concluding remarks.
A. Once Kingsfield or Hart has wis that only infrequently elicit
error messages, he can apply his theory to correct the teaching set:
reject some of its cases as being incorrectly decided.
55. 124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (1891).
56. 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
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B. Leibniz wrote he had prepared
a table, comparable in size to a map, which uses a unique ar-
rangement and method to present the entire common private
law of the Empire today, with all of its fundamental rules and
propositions, and reduces them to first principles so that any
one who understands this table, or has it lying before him, can
decide any fact or case of private law, and at once put his
finger on the basis for the decision in the table itself . . .
He did not dream of the w. s underneath such a table. If Hart's neu-
rons can each have ten different outputs, there are 10Ioo,ooo.ooo.ooo,ooo
possible theories. To get an idea of how many that is, reflect that the
universe contains 1087 elementary particles.58 There are that many pos-
sible pieces of language, one for each theory, but the descriptions of the
theories become prohibitively long. If the neuronal outputs can take
any real values between 0 and 1, there are uncountably many theories.
Then because there are only countably many finite linguistic strings,
the constraint becomes not physical but logical. Either way, almost all
theories can be only incompletely expressed.
C. One can buy a PC program that simulates a neural network.
The description entices, but the uses are frivolous:
For example, harness racing data can be fed into the spread-
sheet front end of BrainMaker Professional and the program
can "learn" to find coincident data patterns that indicate a
winning horse.
With BrainMaker Professional, you can feed in data
from all the football games played this year, as well as the
final scores. By the end of the season, the program should be
able to guess the scores based on the pregame data.59
Fine, but maybe one can teach it law, too. The trick is to encode cases
so the computer can understand them, yet not build a legal theory into
the data, lest the computer adopt that theory, not construct its own.
57. Letter from Gottfried Leibniz to John Philip, March 27, 1699, in Loemker, Introduction:
Leibniz as Philosopher, in G. LEIBNIZ. GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS
AND LETTERS 1, 6 (2d. ed 1969).
58. Churchland, supra note 27, at 94.
59. Dvorak, BrainMaker Professional. Version 1.5, PC MAG., January 15, 1991, at 168. A
better program, in my opinion, is NeuralWare, Inc's NeuralWare Professional Il/PLUS.
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